(Nov. 21, 2007) The Supreme Court of Ohio held today that, when accepting a plea of guilty or no contest in a misdemeanor case involving a petty offense, a trial court judge is required to inform the defendant of the effect of the specific plea being entered, but is not required to explain the effect of alternative pleas that could have been entered but were not.

The Court's 4-3 majority decision was written by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger.

In August 2004, Joseph Jones of Austintown was charged with three counts of domestic violence for allegedly beating his fiancé's children. Jones entered into a plea bargain in which he agreed to plead guilty to a single count of domestic violence and the state agreed to drop the other two counts.

Before accepting Jones' plea of guilty, the trial judge who presided over his hearing engaged in a colloquy (conversation) with him in which the judge advised Jones that by pleading guilty he was giving up his right to a trial before a jury at which the state must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and at which he would have the right to subpoena witnesses and the right to decline to testify or be cross examined. Jones was also informed of the maximum penalties the court could impose for the offense with which he was charged. Jones affirmed that he understood the rights he was giving up and the effects of pleading guilty, and entered a guilty plea. The judge accepted his plea and sentenced Jones to 180 days in jail with 170 days suspended and a fine of $150 plus costs and other sanctions.

Jones subsequently filed a motion seeking leave to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial on the domestic violence charges. After a hearing, the trial court denied that motion, holding that Jones' guilty plea had been entered knowingly and voluntarily and was therefore binding.

On review, the 7^th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered that Jones be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty and have his case decided at trial. The court of appeals held that the trial court's colloquy with Jones at the time it accepted his guilty plea was insufficient because the judge did not also explain what the effect on Jones would be if he entered a plea of no contest, rather than a plea of guilty. The 7^th District certified that its ruling was in conflict with decisions of two other court of appeals districts on the same legal issue. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve the conflict among appellate districts.

Writing for the majority in today's decision, Justice Lanzinger rejected the 7^th District's holding that, under Crim.R. 11(E), before accepting Jones' plea the trial judge was required to advise Jones not only of the effect of entering a plea of guilty, but also the effect of entering a plea of no contest.

“Jones maintains that because he was not told of the effect of both a guilty and a no contest plea by the court, his guilty plea was invalid,” wrote Justice Lanzinger. “He advances this novel interpretation of the wording in the last line of Crim.R. 11(E), which requires the court to inform a defendant ‘of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty.' (Emphasis added.) In Jones's view, the court was required to recite both Crim.R. 11(B)(1) and (2) before taking his guilty plea.”

In rejecting Jones' proposed interpretation of the rule, Justice Lanzinger wrote: “The rules of construction set forth in the Ohio Revised Code are helpful on this point. R.C 1.02(F) provides that ‘“[a]nd” may be read “or,” and “or” may be read “and” if the sense requires it.' This rule operates to avoid inadvertent consequences when logic demands. ... For petty misdemeanors, Crim.R. 11(E) instructs the court that it “may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such pleas without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty.” (Emphasis added.) The singular use of the word ‘plea' does not mean ‘all pleas' possible, but the single plea being entered –for which the court is to explain the effect. Reading ‘and' as ‘or' in the last line of Crim.R. 11(E) is consistent with the remainder of the rule and also avoids a more stringent requirement for a court's acceptance of petty misdemeanors pleas than for felony pleas. ... Therefore, we hold that in accepting a plea to a misdemeanor involving a petty offense, a trial court is required to inform the defendant only of the effect of the specific plea being entered. In this case, the trial court was required to inform Jones only of the effect of a guilty plea, the plea he entered.”

In addressing a second point of law raised in the case, the majority held that the trial court did not fully meet its duty to advise Jones of the effect of his guilty plea because the judge's colloquy failed to comply with a requirement in Crim.R.11(B)(1) that a defendant must be advised that a guilty plea is a “complete admission of guilt” of the charged offense which precludes any future appeal based on a claim of innocence. The Court held, however, that this error did not require allowing Jones to withdraw his guilty plea because a review of the totality of the circumstances of the case did not show that Jones acted without understanding that his guilty plea was a total admission of guilt.

“Jones presented no evidence that at the time of his guilty plea he claimed innocence.” Justice Lanzinger wrote. Under the Supreme Court of Ohio 's 2004 decision in State v. Griggs, she noted, “any error by the trial court in failing to adequately inform him of the effect of his plea was not prejudicial because Jones did not assert his innocence at the colloquy. He is, therefore, presumed to understand that a plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. ... Jones also never asserted at the hearing that he wished to pursue the constitutional issue on appeal. We hold that, under the totality of the circumstances, Jones was aware that a plea of guilty was a complete admission of guilt, and that he was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to inform him of Crim.R. 11(B)(1).”

Justice Lanzinger's opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer and Terrence O'Donnell.

Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton entered a separate opinion concurring with the majority holding that only the specific plea being entered by a defendant must be explained by the judge prior to accepting that plea. Justice Stratton disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that the colloquy between a trial judge and defendant must specifically explain that a guilty plea is a “complete admission of guilt.” “The trial court informed the defendant that he was giving up his right to a jury trial, his right to have the state prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, his right to subpoena witnesses, and his right to testify or remain silent. The trial court also informed the defendant of the possible consequences of his plea in terms of sentencing,” wrote Justice Stratton.

“In plain English, the trial court informed the defendant of the 'effect' of his plea. In my view, the court does not need to tell the defendant that 'pleading guilty' really means 'pleading guilty.' Unless common sense truly is dead, a defendant should know that.”

Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer entered a dissent, joined by Justices Maureen O'Connor and Robert R. Cupp, stating that he would affirm the ruling of the court of appeals that Jones' guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily, and would remand the case for reconsideration of Jones' motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Chief Justice wrote that, in his view, the plain language of Crim.R. 11(E) bars a judge from accepting a plea of guilty or no contest in a misdemeanor case “without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty.”

 “I fail to see the ambiguity in such a sentence in view of the use of 'and,' the conjunctive word. A trial court must advise a defendant seeking to enter a plea of guilty or no contest of the effect of each listed plea. Given the clear plain-language meaning of the rule, we must apply it as written,” wrote Moyer. “Therefore, I would hold that the trial court was required to inform appellee of the effects of all three pleas listed in Crim.R. 11(E). I agree with the majority that Crim.R. 11(B) properly defines the effect of the pleas of guilty and no contest and that the trial court failed to properly advise appellee of the effects of these pleas and the plea of not guilty. Given this failure, the court of appeals correctly held that appellee did not enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.”

ContactsRhys B. Cartwright-Jones, 216.279.1938, for the State of Ohio and Mahoning County prosecutor's office.

Brent L. English, 216.781.9917, for Joseph Jones.

2006-1606 and 2006-1851. State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2007-Ohio-6093.Mahoning App. No. 05-MA-69, 2006-Ohio-3636. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Pfeifer, O'Donnell, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Lundberg Stratton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Moyer, C.J., and O'Connor and Cupp, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2007/2007-Ohio-6093.pdf

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